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Abstract 
The paper re-examines the concerns on the rule-based governance in poor institutional 
environment. By relying on the theories and research vehicles of social psychology, we 
show that under certain conditions, the ‘law on books’ may still play role in governing 
market transactions, even though no formal enforcement applies. We furthermore expose 
the potential of the Corporate Governance Code as the ‘signaling device’ and provide 
arguments as to why this potential may be even stronger in an environment with 
relatively weak institutions in comparison to the developed market economies. 
Introduction 
In introducing best governance practice, OECD countries favor an approach to regulation 
and enforcement that combines relatively high disclosure standards with considerable 
reliance on voluntary governance mechanisms. The question here is how effective 
voluntary mechanisms may be in an environment with relatively weak institutions of 
rule-based governance and weak third party (e.g. market or stakeholder) monitoring 
capabilities (Oman and Blume, 2005:3). This is more so since, in this kind of institutional 
environment, the effectiveness of the ‘law on books’ becomes questionable too. 
Particularly with regard to the emerging markets (e.g. transition countries) it has been 
often claimed that without efficient institutions (e.g. judiciary) improving, for example, 
company law makes no sense and contributes nothing to the investor protection (Pistor et 
al., 2000; Dyck, 2001; Berglöf and Claessens, 2004). The enforcement of rules provides 
the rationale for the legal rules to exist in the first place. Consequently, the 
recommendation is to rely on other, alternative sources to legal governance, such as 
private ordering or private enforcement of the law, together with more visible role of self-
regulatory agencies.4 It is the aim of our paper to re-examine the concerns regarding the 
limited legal obedience5 and the limited role of the voluntary rules. By relying on the 
theories and research vehicles of the social psychology and social norms, we argue that 
‘law on books’ can still play a role in governing market transactions, even though no 
formal enforcement applies. We furthermore expose the potential of the Corporate 
Governance Code (CG Code) as the ‘device’ for signaling firms’ commitment to the 
adoption of best practice and provide arguments as to why this potential may be, under 
certain conditions, even stronger and more beneficial in poor institutional environment. 
 
As shown by Bohnet et al. (2000:3) in fact, if the actors know that the legal system is 
inefficient, i.e. that contracts are rarely enforced, they will be extremely cautious. Thus, 
the absence of enforceability and other forms of guarantees generates demand for 
gathering information about the other party's characteristics or reputation (Wintrobe, 
1995 in Bohnet et al., 2000:5).6,  7 In the same line, Gilson and Krakmaan (1984) propose 
firm reputation and related signals of corporate character (e.g. financial intermediaries’ 
ratings, experts’ verification of product quality, etc.) as the alternative mechanisms that 
help investors economize on the transaction costs when the markets or other institutions 
are not fully efficient. Several other studies show that investors, employees, customers 
and other firm constituencies make their choices by evaluating firm trustworthiness, 
which is primarily determined by firm reputation. Consequently, the desire to protect 
their reputation can inhibit the firms from engaging in activities that the investors and 
other stakeholders deem unacceptable (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990:233). Non-obeying 
or violating investor legal rights could be one of these activities. If upholding a social 
norm, such as obeying the law (Cooter, 1998) influences the investor perception of a 
firm’s character (reputation), some of the firms will be motivated to obey rules, even 
without formal sanctions. 8 In fact, people (entities) seldom obey the law because they 
fear the (formal) punishment, but rather because they believe it is ‘proper to do so’ 
(Tyler, 1990). Thus, the society will penalize legal disobedience if ‘there is a general 
norm in favor of obeying the law’.9 To put it differently, in order for the reputation 
mechanism to matter in enforcing the law, investors have to attribute the non-obedience 
of the legal rules to the defecting firm rather than to environmental inefficiencies (e.g. 
lack of confidence in the courts) and act accordingly.  
 
We study the case of Slovenia, an advanced transition country that is however 
characterized by high inefficiencies in the legal enforcement and institutions’ 
functioning. The results of our experiment and option survey, specifically focusing on the 
legislation in the area of company and commercial law, show that in Slovenia non-
compliance with the legal rules is perceived as something negative, shameful and 
potentially harmful for firm reputation. Notwithstanding the lacunas in the institutional 
enforcement, the general mistrust in the judiciary and the small size of the economy, 
where personal relations may have more importance in governing market transactions 
then the rules, legal obedience is embedded in the social norms. This ensures the 
necessary condition for the social sanctions to apply. We show that these sanctions 
realize (also) through the loss of firm reputation and trustworthiness in the eyes of the 
business community and firm investors (the market).10  On the other hand, respecting 
recommendations of best practice (CG Code) is not yet considered ‘a norm’. Firm 
managers do not (yet) perceive that the market pressure for the adoption of these 
recommendations is relevant. This is to a certain extent also reflected in the analysis of 
the declarations of the compliance with the CG Code. However, the low consensus11 in 
relation to the introduction and obedience of the Code makes it more likely that the 
market will attribute the behavior of the firms to the intrinsic motivation and 
characteristics of the firms, namely their voluntary commitment to improve the way they 
are governed. This should consequently increase the payoffs in the form of reputation 
improvements from introducing best practice. Although this remains an open question for 
our future research, we provide examples of Slovenian firms that have been widely 
disclosing corporate matters, even beyond the recommendations of the CG Code. The 
adoption of best governance practice follows the expected payoff from signalling; the 
level of voluntary disclosure partly reflects the characteristics of the firm ownership 
structure, market efficiency and the identity of the main investors. We consequently 
expect the Code to play a stronger role in the future, in line with the changes in their 
ownership structure, the withdrawal of the State and the internationalization of firm 
activities and financing. 
 
The article is structured as follows.  After the introduction, the second part briefly 
describes the judiciary system and the dynamics in the introduction of best practice in 
Slovenia. The third part overviews the theory on reputation and internalization of law. 
Perceptions and opinions on the role of rules and recommendations are evaluated in the 
fourth part. Conclusion and discussion follow. 
Judiciary in Slovenia 
Despite the quality of the law on books in Slovenia (see EBRD, 2006), the functioning of 
the courts and the enforcement procedure is close to catastrophe (Heritage Foundation 
Index, 2005). According to the World Bank (2006), it takes more than two years to 
recover debt. For instance, it takes approximately the same time to enforce a contract in 
Colombia, Mozambique and Lebanon.12, ,13 14 Due to the lengthy trials, Slovenia had to 
pay, up until July of 2006, approximately EURO 500.000,00 in damages to Slovenian 
entities. There are approximately 100 cases against Slovenia still pending at European 
Court for Human Rights at Strasbourg (Finance, 2006, p.12) and the number keeps on 
increasing.  For instance, it takes on average one year to be entered in the Slovenian land 
register as an owner of a real estate and at least 60 days to start a limited liability 
company.15,16 Also, in 2004, commercial courts, (excluding bankruptcy cases and 
compulsory settlement cases), solved only 51 % of the cases filed in a certain year.17  In a 
period between one to three years, they solved 28.4% of the cases, and the rest of the 
cases had to wait (or are still waiting) more than three years to be solved.18 The worst 
situation is at the enforcement courts, since cases at the enforcement courts represent 59 
% of all the cases that are treated as backlogged cases.19,20 The backlogs are so high that 
it would take only the enforcement court up to three years to clear them, if they work at 
the same speed as now and they would not get any new cases, to solve all cases.  Zajc 
and Trampuz (2005), by stating very conservative assumptions, evaluated social costs of 
backlogs in the enforcement courts (which represent a small percentage of all courts in 
Slovenia) at almost 0.28% of the Slovenian GDP.   
 
Even though the judicial system hasn’t been functioning for the last 11 years, there seems 
to be no political will to improve it. On the other hand, significant improvements have 
been made in the promotion of good business practice. In order to define in more detail 
the governance and management principles of the public joint-stock companies, to 
contribute to transparent and intelligible governance system and to promote the 
confidence of domestic and foreign investors (Slovenian Corporate Governance Code, 
p.2), the Ljubljana Stock Exchange, the Association of Supervisory Board Members and 
the Managers’ Association adopted the Slovenian Corporate Governance Code (CG 
Code) in March 2004. Apart from the provisions of the relevant legislation with direct 
bearing on the corporate governance system (expressed by means of an appropriate form 
of ‘must’), the CG Code introduces voluntary practice through: i) the provision 
containing the word ‘should’, which have the nature of recommendations and are not 
legally binding but need to be complied with or explained; ii) optional provisions, which 
are expressed with the words ‘it is recommended that/it can be done’.  
Rules, best practice and firm reputation  
The higher the informational asymmetry in the markets, the higher the ambiguity of 
market transactions and the poorer the functioning of the courts and other institutions of 
legal governance, the more reputation should matter in determining the choices of firm 
constituencies.21 Consequently, in a weak institutional environment reputation to 
significant extent influences firm performance: it increases the potential for profit 
margins on firm product and services, it improves firm access to the capital markets, and 
it attracts investors, employees and customers. In this regard, reputation is a general 
perception of firm quality, based on different signals such as information about the firm 
management, financial performance, quality of product and services, long-term 
investment value, innovativeness, financial soundness, reliability to perform contracts 
and promises, ability to attract, develop and keep talented people, community and 
environmental responsibility and the use of corporate assets.22 Finally however, what 
matters is the assimilation and verifiability of this information. Human judgment about 
corporate reputation in fact depends on the individuals’ perception of the environment 
and to its related interpretation of the information of the observed behavior (Dhir, 2005). 
As suggested by the traditional attribution theory, the society will attribute a particular 
behavior (e.g. non-compliance with a legal rule) to internal characteristics of the actor 
(i.e. her character) when her behavior differs from the one observed at or expected as a 
normal one (Evans, 2006:7). 23 With regards to legal enforcement we can thus expect 
that, if the legal disobedience is perceived as something ‘normal’, the society will tend to 
discount its importance by searching for a justification in the factors external to the 
defecting actor. When this is the case, the firms will know that the society marks the 
defection as insignificant and consequently have more reasons to disobey since (in their 
estimation) the defection payoffs will be higher than the reputation losses (Eberl, 
2004:263). To put it differently, a firm will uphold a social norm when commitment 
conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences that is, when the net price of 
upholding the social norm is positive (Cooter, 1998).24 Similar reasoning underlines the 
compliance with voluntary recommendations (i.e. CG Code). 
 To sum up, to exert an impact on firm reputation, the market has to perceive the non-
compliance with a legal rule or a recommendation as something that is not ‘normal’ or 
expected. In fact, the public may pay no attention to a rule/recommendation, when 
rules/recommendations are not generally complied with in the society (high consensus in 
non-compliance). This could likely be the case in the countries with poor legal 
enforcement. The compliance with the rules may also be less important for firm 
reputation when the public has little trust in the judiciary and the law making institutions 
(due to corruption) and may consequently perceive the legal rules as the product of the 
interest group pressure with little benefits for the general public.  
Public perception of non-compliance and related social sanctions 
 
We evaluate the public’s perception of the firm disobedience of norms and 
recommendations by performing an experiment involving a group of MBA students at the 
Faculty of Economics at the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia).25 The students were 
identified with numbers, so that their anonymity was fully preserved. As shown in Table 
1 below, they have some general knowledge of good governance practice and most of 
them have at least sometimes invested in shares. Their perception about the legal 
environment complies with the finding in section II: they generally conceive the rules as 
poorly enforced. 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Perception of the legal environment by the participants of the experiment 
 
OPINIONS ABOUT THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT IN SLOVENIA MEAN (MEDIAN) 
What is your knowledge about Corporate Governance? 
1-poor   5-I know the subject well 
3(3) 
Have you ever invested in firm shares? 
1-never  5-very often 
2.11(2) 
How effective is your national Parliament as a law-making institution?  
1-very ineffective 5-very effective 
2 (2) 
The legal framework in your country for private businesses to settle disputes 
and challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations is:  
1-inefficient and subject to manipulation;  5-efficient and neutral 
2.35(2) 
Is the judiciary in your country independent from influences of members of 
government, citizens or firms?1-no,-heavily influenced;   5- yes, entirely 
independent 
2.47 (3) 
Is the judiciary in your country efficient in enforcing law? 
1-totally inefficient;   5-very efficient 
2.41(2) 
 
The students26 were asked to evaluate the decision to appoint a former CEO (currently in 
retirement) on the firm’s Supervisory Board. Initially (‘control’ conditions), they were 
provided with a general description of the potential conflicts involved in the nomination 
of a former CEO on the Supervisory Board. They were told that the nomination of the 
former CEO on the Supervisory Board was proposed by the current CEO. The latter was 
actually employed by the former CEO and the two have been working closely since then. 
After the retirement, the former CEO continued having lunches with the new CEO and 
the Management Board members. The members of the Management Board justified the 
nomination of a former CEO by stating that ‘his experience in the field will largely 
contribute to the company’s success.’ The description included no reference to any rule 
or best practice in relation to the appointment of a former CEO on the Supervisory Board. 
The students had to indicate the agreements (on a scale from 1: ‘I definitely don’t agree’ 
to 5: ‘I strongly agree’) with the statements capturing the impact of the nomination on the 
student’s perception of firm’s reputation and trustworthiness. The statements and the 
corresponding results are presented in Table 2 below. 
 
The second round of questions instantly followed the first round. The students were not 
allowed to discuss among themselves in between the two rounds. In the second round, 
they were randomly split in two groups (12 persons each). The first version 
(‘recommendation’) of the case, which was distributed to a half of the students, included 
the following statements: ‘In proposing the new member of the Supervisory Board, the 
management has disregarded that he may not be objective in supervising the 
Management Board since, due to the past collaboration, he and the Management Board 
are old friends. In fact, the proponents of the good business practice do not recommend 
appointing an old manager on the Supervisory Board. On the other hand, the new 
member has a substantial experience in business, which may largely offset the drawbacks 
associated with eventual conflict of interests or lack of objective supervision’. The second 
version (‘law’), on the other hand, included the following statements: ‘By appointing the 
former board member on Management Board, the firm voluntary violated the article 10 
of the Companies Act which explicitly states that: ‘The person who has been member of 
the company’s Management Board or member of the management of associated 
companies within the last three years can not be appointed on the Supervisory Board’. In 
fact, the legislator doubts about the objectivity of an ex board member to exert 
supervision over his ‘old friends’. However, given the court delays in the country, it 
would take a shareholder more than 5 years to get a redress for the violation (when 
finding out that he/she was misled). The managers of the company believe that the 
benefits from appointing a former CEO on the Board largely exceed the costs of potential 
court litigation.’  
 
After reading the second version (either ‘law’ of ‘recommendation’) the students were 
again asked to express their agreement/disagreement with the statements indicated in 
Table 2. The table also presents the means (medians) and the significance in the 
difference between the means of the control conditions and each of the two versions 
respectively. Finally, the students answered some manipulation checks, demographic 
questions and stated their opinions with reference to the statements presented in Table 1 
(see above). 
 
Table 2: Perception of non-compliance of legal rules and recommendations 
(5-I strongly agree; 4-I agree; 3-I am uncertain; 2-I don’t agree; 1-definitely don’t agree) 
 control recommendation law  
 Mean (Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
The nomination of a former manager in the Supervisory 
Board is beneficial to the company. 
3(3) 2.66(2.5) 2.62 (3)** 
 
The new member will exert an objective and efficient 
supervision of the managers. 
3(3) 2.92(2) 
 
2.46(2)** 
The company’s management can be trusted. 3.29 (3) 3.375 (3) 2.4(2)** 
The shares of company in question are a good 
investment. 
2.94 (3) 3(3) 2.69(2**) 
Following the nomination of a new member, my 
opinion of the company and its management has 
deteriorated. 
2.88(2) 3 (3) 3.53(4)** 
I believe most of the other companies also have former 
managers on their Supervisory Boards.  
3.18(4) 3(2.5) 2.5(2.5)** 
**Significant at 5 percent level. 
 
The comparison of the students’ perception between the versions ‘control’ and ‘law’ 
show that the non-compliance with the legal rule significantly hurts the reputation of the 
company and reduces the trustworthiness of the firm management. On average, in the 
‘law’ version the students tend to agree less with the fact that the nomination is beneficial 
for the company and with the fact that the new Board member will exert an objective 
supervision. They trust less in the management of the company and to a lower extent 
consider the company as a good investment. On the other hand, they mostly expect that 
the other firms will follow the law; non-compliance is thus not considered something 
‘normal’ in the society. On the other hand, no significant differences in relation to the 
‘control’ version are observed in the version ‘recommendation’. These results somehow 
imply that not respecting a recommendation is considered less harmful in the terms of 
corporate reputation than not-respecting a legal rule. This is so despite the fact that the 
participants of the experiments were explicitly ‘reminded’ about the inefficiency of the 
judiciary in the country and despite the fact that they actually perceive the judiciary as 
inefficient (see Table 1).  In sum, students therefore treat obedience of law as ‘normal’ or 
expected, which is less the case in regard to the obedience of recommendations.  
 
In order to ‘double - check27’ the results, we collected the opinions about the role of legal 
compliance for firm reputation from a sample (32) of successful young executives (of age 
under 40) of the top Slovenian companies. If the non-compliance with the legal rule is 
generally attributed to the inefficiencies in the legal environment and the low reliance on 
the law, the managers will feel little social pressure to comply with the legal rules. First, 
the managers were asked to express their agreements or disagreements with the 
statements reflecting the importance of different factors for firm reputation (1-completely 
disagree; 3-partly agree; 5-fully agree). The questionnaires were again anonymous and 
the results provide support to the claims stated above. The managers in general fully 
agree that the reputation is important for corporate performance (M28=4.51, SE29=0.15). 
Similarly, full agreement is reflected with regard to the compliance with the legal rules 
(M = 4.27, SE=0.19), respect of contractual obligations (M= 4.53), firm financial 
performance (M = 4.18, SE=0.17) and listing on the Stock Exchange (M = 4, SE= 0.20). 
Similar importance as to the legal rules is attributed to the accepted social standards 
(M=4.14, SE=0.18; t (28) = 0.55, p<0.3). Compliance with the CG Code and other 
recommendations of business practice is however less important (M = 3.7, SE = 0.19), t 
(27) = 2.7497, p<0.1, r = 0.46) than the compliance (or non-compliance) with the legal 
rules themselves.  
 
The superiority of social pressure for legal compliance in relation to recommendations is 
confirmed also in our analysis of the Declarations of Compliance issued by the Slovenian 
joint stock companies. For instance, several companies deviate from the Code provisions 
with a justification that they ‘comply with the legislative requirements’. Some companies 
rely on this justification quite extensively. In 2006, this validation was most frequently 
used for the recommendation to determine rules on limitations of trade in company’s 
share in internal bylaws, the use of international accounting standards for non-
consolidated accounts, etc. Moreover, the improvements in the number of issued 
declarations since the first adoption of the CG Code can be attributed to an actual change 
in the regulation: the amendment of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange Rules in 2005, which 
now require the issuers of shares traded on the official market to make a public disclosure 
of the declaration of compliance (Cankar, 2006).30  
 The results show that it is not (yet) perceived that the CG Code should be respected. This 
is probably due to the fact that the CG Code is relatively new (adopted in March 18, 
2004) and that it introduces some relatively high requirements that might well 
characterize corporate practice corporations in the countries with a long tradition in 
market economy, but which are more difficult to follow in an environment of transition.31 
In any case, in absence of any ‘real’ social sanction for non-compliance with the 
recommendations of best practice, the adoption or respect of the CG Code should result 
from the intrinsic motivation of the firms themselves. Given that the CG Code or better 
put, respecting CG is not yet a social norm, the effect of such compliance could be 
stronger than in the developed economies, where the CG Code has been widely followed. 
In terms of the attribution theory, low consensus behavior (i.e. a behavior that differs 
from the behavior of the others in the same situation) is more likely to be attributed to the 
internal characteristics of the actor. Thus, by complying with the best business practice, 
the firm may signal its ‘commitment’ to applying the ‘above-high’ standards of corporate 
governance. Moreover, the absence of real social pressure to a certain extent ensures the 
credibility of the signals provided. As shown by Cowen, Glazer and Zajc (2000)32 when 
firms do not feel threatened to comply, they might reveal about themselves much more 
and more detailed information or adopt more (or less) credible actions as compared to the 
situation in which they are bound by stringent rules.  
 
Few Slovenian firms in fact already follow the example of the Western corporations and 
implement high standards in their operations and governance. We try to analyze the 
factors underlying the adoption of best practice by extending the Berglof and Pajuste 
(2005) study on the disclosure practices. Our study involves a sample of 72 Slovenian 
public companies at the end of 2005. While the disclosure lags behind in a large part of 
the firms, we find that few firms (6) publish a separate Corporate Governance section on 
the web page, 17 firms had bylaws available on-line, while 33% of firms provided some 
kind of information on the ownership structure (although not yet recommended by the 
Code at the time of our analysis). The results of our empirical analysis imply that the 
level of disclosure follows33 the potential pay-offs from transparency. The latter are (in 
our view) determined also by the investors’ capacity and motivation to understand and 
‘use’ the information provided by the firms. Transparency is higher in larger firms (b = 
0.30, p<0.5); in firms with a higher number of small shareholders (b = 0.43, p<0.1); in 
the firms with the shares listed on more efficient, official market, which ensures a better 
incorporation of the information in the firm value (b = 0.75, p<0.1) and; in the firms with 
a larger share of financial investors, which probably value firm transparency more highly 
(b=0.011, p<0.1).34 This is somehow in line with the conclusions of other studies, which 
predict the compliance with the Code to increase with the growing influence of 
institutional shareholders and their willingness to invest on a global scale, with a 
country’s integration in the world trading system and with its progress in the economic 
liberalization and integration (Cankar et al., 2007; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
 
One caveat however applies. In arguing about the role of the CG Code as a ‘signal of 
commitment’ to good practice, we implicitly assumed that the public (investors) agrees 
with the recommendations of the CG Code. Only if this is the case, the adoption of CG 
recommendations will be actually perceived as a positive signal. In ensuring the latter, 
the Ljubljana Stock Exchange has been following three main policies. Firstly, Slovenian 
CG Code arises as a product of the general business practice, as a compromise between 
the external recommendations (OECD Principles) and the requirements of the firm 
managers and their supervisors. With the aim to reach a general consensus, the Ljubljana 
Stock Exchange has decided to invite two additional partners to draft the CG Code: the 
Managers’ Association (representing the CEOs) and the Association of the Supervisory 
Board Members (representing the supervisors). The three ‘underwriters’ of the CG Code 
have fully committed to the promotion of the CG Code among its members. Secondly, 
the underwriters continuously evaluate the appropriateness of the provisions for the 
average firm in the economy and adjust them accordingly.35 Thirdly, it is important that 
the general acceptance of the Code is explicit: with this aim, the authors of the Code 
invited several institutions to express their support to the Code. In 2006, the Slovenian 
Institute of Auditors, the Stock Exchange Members’ Association, the Slovenian 
Employers’ Association, the All-Slovenian Association of Small Shareholders, and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia have signed the statements of accession 
to the CG Code and thus committed to strive to implement and promote the Code in their 
respective areas of businesses. The implementation of the CG Code has also won the 
support of the Bank of Slovenia, while no such support was unfortunately (yet) expressed 
by the main shareholders of Slovenian firms: the State-controlled Funds and the 
Association of the Investment Funds’ Management Companies.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our analysis, relying on the theory of social norms, indicates that improving law on 
books and/or recommendations might still have a role, even in the deficient institutional 
environment such as Slovenia. This finding to certain extend contradicts some of the 
existing claims in literature, which condition the functioning of the legal rules to their 
enforcement in the legal practice.   
 
Indeed, as argued by Sunstein (1996:909), people feel shame when they violate social 
norms. This may be the case also in the absence of any formal mechanism that would 
sanction the violation of norms in the society. Thus, if the society internalizes a legal rule 
or if obeying the law is perceived as a social norm, the society might sanction any non-
compliance, when (if) observed. One of the mechanisms, through which social sanctions 
work, is through the loss of firm reputation and trustworthiness. By relying on 
experiments and option survey as a research vehicle, we show that the above-mentioned 
social sanctions apply even in an environment with inefficient judiciary, where the 
incorporation of the legal rules and their respect and obedience in social norms may be 
limited. Notwithstanding the fact that the social pressures to obey law on books can to a 
certain extent substitute the formal institutions, strong effort should still be directed 
towards improving the functioning of the courts and the judiciary. There is in fact an 
extensive range of empirical research confirming the role of institutions in promoting 
economic growth and ensuring the success in transition.36
 
It is moreover not our intention to generalize the results to all the countries with poor 
judiciary and to the implementation of the ‘law on books’ in general. We believe that, in 
order for the (social) norms to have a role, some other conditions need to be satisfied: the 
society must reach a certain level of economic development, openness, culture and 
morality. Most importantly, it needs to share some legal knowledge, information 
dissemination about the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘verifiability’ of the compliance in practice. 
In this regard, the Slovenian CG Code plays an important role. By summarizing the main 
legal requirements (propositions with must) it certainly increases the public (investors) 
awareness of its rights and raises the ‘anchor’ of the public judgments in relation to the 
firms and their behavior. Also, by its recommendations, it increases the public’s 
awareness of certain standards, which are desired in the business community and lays the 
grounds for internalization of such rules. 
 
Although it is not (yet) perceived as a social norm, we expect that the reliance on the CG 
Code will increase in the future, in line with the changes in the ownership structure of 
Slovenian firms, withdrawal of the State funds from the economy, further integration of 
financial markets and consequently, stronger presence of educated investors, which will 
appreciate firm commitment to best practice highly. In the long run, its role may upgrade 
from a ‘commitment’ device to a generally accepted norm: in line with the advancements 
of transition and the development of a well-educated shareholder base, the compliance 
with the Code may not be an exception but will become ‘a rule’. 
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